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The Dancing Politicians
by Aahan PrakashThe people whom Trump had brought over. He was still in the stratosphere when I met with him in the Oval on April 25. He had just made the announcement, saying it was the most unusual announcement he had ever seen. Trump was still in the mood, but the truth was out there.
I said we needed to talk about the Iran nuclear deal because we had too many Russian and Chinese allies in Europe, which was a total nonstarter. Pompeo said Russia had long been more aggressive than Iran, but they had been a mere second-tier power, and they were not as dangerous as Russia was. I said we should talk about this at some point, but the bigger point was that we needed to talk about this deal. Trump said he thought Russia had great leverage, but it was all an effort to protect Hillary Clinton, and he wanted to talk about it in early October. I said I would talk to Pompeo, who was at the G7 in Canada, watching the Buenos Aires G20. He said he would tell Trump that Russia was doing what it had done in Syria, which was a total nonstarter. We needed to get off Russia talking, not Iran. I said we should talk about this at some point.
Trump said again that he thought Putin wanted the deal, which was impressive, but that if we talked about it, Putin would be very unhappy. We needed to talk about it, but Pompeo said that, after all the talking, Putin was now ready to take our word for it. Trump said, “I don’t know how much longer we can keep this going,” before I realized it was on record raising the issue of Syria with Putin as a reason for not discussing the Iran nuclear deal.
I left for Israel on Friday, October 10, the day after the G7 was relegated. Israel had been in the mess hall for almost six hours before I was there, traveling with Trump in his motorcade. I had spoken to him before he arrived, and he was visibly unhappy with the Iran deal, which was not right but important enough that he was willing to make it a priority. I conveyed this to my Israeli counterparts, who said they wanted to talk at some point, but they had to talk about it, which was not exactly reassuring. Israel’s Foreign Minister Avigdor Liberman said, “This is not about the Iran nuclear deal.” I was worried about the possibility of Obama-era sanctions relief, which I thought was a good idea. Israel’s Foreign Minister Avigdor Liberman (centre) in front of the Israel Foreign Ministry on Friday, October 10, 2017.
[(Evan Vucci/AP) US President Donald Trump speaks during a tour of the Yad Vashem Holocaust memorial in Jerusalem on October 10, 2017.]
At about one thirty p.m., I thought we had the Iran nuclear deal (which is always a problem for the US), and I called Pompeo, who was in Israel, to congratulate him on his successful trip. After the call, I called Netanyahu, who had just come to visit, and told him we needed to get Iran out of the G7, which was going very badly, not just in terms of terrorism but also nuclear proliferation. Netanyahu was surprised we hadn’t already given Iran more nuclear attention, which was good news, since Iran was already one of the world’s biggest oil importers, and he wanted to get Iran off our plate of gold.
At nine thirty a.m., I called Pompeo, who was in Israel, to tell him we needed to get Iran out of the G7 and keep the nuclear deal. I didn’t like that Pompeo and I were talking about Iran, but he said, “We’re getting all the Western Hemisphere attention,” so I said we should get it out of the G7.
The next day, I called Trump to tell him what had happened, and he said, “I don’t like it,” which I thought was a big concession. I left the White House around three p.m., and was never more than a little nervous. I left the White House at six fifteen to go home, and then went back in the morning to get breakfast ready for my return trip to Israel.
On Monday morning, I met with Israeli Prime Minister Bibi Netanyahu, who was still in Israel to attend the G7, to see if there were any more issues.
Amongst the other things, Trump decided to send the letter home after a long day of negotiations, to Pompeo and Mnuchin on Saturday, June 18, after we all feared the letter would be too much for Pompeo and his team to handle. Pompeo and Mnuchin were in the Oval alone, seeing how the negotiations were going, and they were already discussing what to do next. Trump asked if we were going to the Hill, to which I said I was probably going to the Hill, which he agreed with. He also said, “You’re a ’hole,” meaning no one could get to the Hill, which I had no problem getting around.
The next day, however, Trump went to the Oval, and I saw him again briefly, but was not in the mood to discuss it. Instead, he said to me, “I have to get out of Washington.” I had left the Oval earlier, but I assured him I would be back at the Hill briefing on Monday, June 19, at eleven a.m. Washington time, so I had time to get to the Hill. I went to the Oval, and there, in the streets, I heard Trump say, “I’m going to the Hill.” I turned to look at the press pool, and saw Pompeo and Mnuchin both waiting nearby, so I could tell them the situation was serious. I tried calling the White House press office, but they said, “We’ll be calling the National Security Council.” I hoped we would soon find out what had happened.
I called the press line at about 5:30 a.m. by hearing a Trump commentator say, “The press is out of line,” which was inaccurate, because I said I would be at the White House briefing. I called again about 5:55 to report the same conversation, but it was still not working. I called back at about 6:20 to tell the press line was still open, but it didn’t work. I called again to report that Pompeo and his team had come to the White House on Friday to meet with Trump and the press pool, and there it was again. It was not working, and Pompeo and all his people were flying back to the White House.
I came to the White House at 6:40 a.m. to see Trump, and he said, “I’m out of line.” I said, “What are you talking about?” and asked what was wrong with the line, which was standard news reporting, but Pompeo said, “I’m out of line.” I called back at 6:59 to report Pompeo had come to the White House on Friday, and Trump had come back to the Oval to meet with the press pool, and there it was again. It didn’t work. I called back at 6:59 to report that Pompeo and his departments had come to the White House to meet with Trump, and there was no reason to believe they were there. I called again to report that Pompeo’s press line was not working. I called again at 6:59 to report that Pompeo’s press office was not working, and Trump had come back to the Oval to meet with the press pool. I pulled together a line of paper from the Oval Office, and the line was running down, about to break. I called back at 6:59 again to report Pompeo’s line was not working, and Trump had come back to the Oval, but there was no break. Finally, at 6:59, Pompeo said, “I’m out of line,” and we agreed we should hold off onto the press pool.
I spoke to Dunford, who was still calling the White House press line, and he said the press was out of line, and the White House press line was not in place.
